Because sanctions stop nuclear acquisition, I negate.

As ought indicates moral obligation, the value is **Morality**. The primary obligation of states is to protect their citizens because citizens enable the conditions for a moral community and deserve primary protect in return for constant coercion. Andrea Sangiovanni[[1]](#footnote--1) agrees.

Consider the basic extractive, regulative, and distributive capacities central to any modern state. When well-functioning, these **[First,] basic state capacities, backed by** a system of **courts, administration, police, and military, free us from the need to protect ourselves continuously from physical attack, guarantee access to a legally regulated market, and establish and stabilize a system of property rights and entitlements.** Consider further that state capacity in each of these areas is not manna from heaven. **It requires a financial and sociological basis** to function effectively, indeed **even to exist. Yet, the global order**, in all cases but those of failed and occupied states, **does not provide this basis.** Although the global order secures the recognition of the state as a legal person in international law and in some cases also provides an external source of finance (e.g., through IMF loans), **[Second,] citizens and residents,** in all but the most extreme cases, **provide the financial and sociological support required to sustain the state.** It is they who constitute and maintain the state **through taxation,** through **participation in** various forms of **political activity, and** through **simple compliance,** which includes the full range of our everyday, legally regulated activity. **Without their contributions to the de facto authority of the state**—contributions paid in the coin of compliance, trust, resources, and participation—**we would lack the individual capabilities to function as citizens, producers, and biological beings.**

As such, the value criterion is **protecting citizens**, defined as minimizing harm to people of the sender state.

**My thesis and sole contention is that export controls on nuclear and dual-use materials ought to be maintained in order to punish and prevent potential proliferation.**

Export controls stop proliferation by delaying acquisition, raising costs, and strengthening norms. Scott Jones et al[[2]](#footnote-0). write in 2009.

What are strategic trade controls capable of doing? **First,** strategic **trade controls can delay a country** or group **seeking WMD by** months, **years, and even decades.** Although Iraq was able to bypass strategic trade controls in obtaining military-related goods and technology, Saddam **Hussein may well have possessed nuclear weapons at the** start of the **Gulf War had there been no controls** in place. Further,strategic **[Second] trade controls can delay** WMD **development, which allows for political change or diplomatic pressure to take hold. For example,** strategic trade **controls** appear to **have been instrumental in slowing nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil, allowing for political transitions** that led both states **to** later **renounce nuclear arms."** Strategic **[Third,] trade controls can** alsoserve as a **deter**rent **by raising the costs of pursuing WMD. States bent on illicitly acquiring weapons must factor** in these additional costs andrecognize **that they could invest billions in covert** technology acquisition **efforts with no guarantee of a return** on investment. **Finally, strategic trade controls** help to **reinforce international non-proliferation norms." States whose WMD** programs and **ambitions are exposed face limited access to technology and greater international scrutiny. *For instance, Iran,*** *which is accused by the United States of pursuing nuclear weapons and**supporting terrorism,* ***has suffered both from technology denial and from political isolation resulting from its weapons ambitions."***

Absent export controls, there would be a vast increase in the number of proliferators by giving nations unfettered access to WMD capacity. Richard Cupitt[[3]](#footnote-1) describes the link.

On the negative side, it seems likely that **both China and Russia would have far more dangerous strategic** and conventional **weapons systems.** Several **programs** of proliferation concern **would be much more advanced,** **including** those of **North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Libya, Syria, Israel, and Pakistan. Terrorist organizations would have easier access to sensitive items. [Finally, ]Without the costs imposed by controls,** moreover, **other countries or groups might take a new interest in developing weapons of mass destruction.** The absence of export controls would undermine nonproliferation norms generally as no government could implement effectively their obligations under several conventions. To the extent that economic prosperity depends upon a relatively stable global military and political framework, then instability related to proliferation also could diminish some of the economic gains from freer trade in dual-use items.

These more extreme and less stable proliferators will put nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. David Jonas and Christopher Swift[[4]](#footnote-2) in 08 summarize the state-centric view.

*Note: [depend] included in original text.*

That thinking appears to rely on the assumption that **[First,] terrorists** are "not individual psychotics acting on their own but agents of organizations that **[depend] on the sponsorship of various governments."** [n16](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1271991356316&returnToKey=20_T9165213257&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.238820.26538040568" \l "n16) This approach emphasizes state action while minimizing the autonomy of non-state actors, thus categorizing contemporary terrorism as a subset of armed conflict among sovereign nations. Viewed from this perspective**, a nuclear**-armed **Iraq might proliferate** warheads or fissile material **to al-Qaeda in a bid to mitigate U.S. influence in the greater Middle East.** [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1271991356316&returnToKey=20_T9165213257&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.238820.26538040568" \l "n17) **Likewise,** a **nuclear**-capable **Iran "might cascade** either weapons, weapons-grade material for dirty bombs, or technical knowledge**" to its Shi'a allies in Hezbollah,** [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1271991356316&returnToKey=20_T9165213257&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.238820.26538040568" \l "n18) perhaps **in an effort to extend its strategic reach or establish an undeterrable retaliatory capacity.** In either case, the non-state actors involved are viewed either as agents implementing state policy, or as proxies dependent on state largess. But for the safe havens and financial support rogue state regimes provide, the prevailing presumption is that these otherwise marginal actors would lack the technical and material resources necessary to consider threatening states, let alone undermine international peace and security. [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1271991356316&returnToKey=20_T9165213257&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.238820.26538040568" \l "n19) [**Second] A similar calculus applies to** failed or **failing states.** Here the danger is not direct proliferation by a hostile regime to an equally hostile terrorist syndicate, but rather the prospect that Islamic **[where] extremists might capture critical military hardware.** As Matthew Bunn observes, "keeping nuclear weapons or materials from being stolen is the most direct and reliable tool for preventing nuclear terrorism, for **once such items have disappeared, the problem of** finding them or **stopping terrorists from using them multiplies enormously."** [n20](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1271991356316&returnToKey=20_T9165213257&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.238820.26538040568" \l "n20) Those threats are most pronounced in nuclear powers **where munitions and materials are poorly controlled, or where the governing regime faces prolonged internal unrest and faltering popular support.** [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1271991356316&returnToKey=20_T9165213257&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.238820.26538040568" \l "n21)

Graham Allison in 06[[5]](#footnote-3) quantifies the impact to nuclear terrorism.

On a normal workday**, half a million** people **crowd** the area **within a half-mile** radius **of** New York City's **Times Square.** **If terrorists detonated a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon** in the heart of midtown Manhattan, **the blast would kill them all instantly. Hundreds of thousands of others would die from collapsing buildings, fire, and fallout** in the hours and days thereafter. The blast would instantly vaporize Times Square, Grand Central Terminal, and every other structure within half a mile of the point of detonation. Buildings three-quarters of a mile from ground zero would be fractured husks. Lest this seem too hypothetical, recall an actual incident that occurred in New York City one month to the day after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. A CIA agent, code-named Dragonfire, reported that Al Qaeda had acquired a live nuclear weapon produced by the former Soviet Union and had successfully smuggled it into New York City. [3] A top-secret Nuclear Emergency Support Team was dispatched to the city. Under a cloak of secrecy that excluded even Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, these nuclear ninjas searched for the 10-kiloton bomb whose blast could have obliterated a significant portion of Manhattan. Fortunately, Dragonfire's report turned out to be a false alarm. But the central takeaway from the Dragonfire case is this: The U.S. government had no grounds in science or in logic to dismiss the warning. A nuclear terrorist attack on the United States would have catastrophic consequences even for other countries. After the nuclear detonation, **the immediate reaction would be to block** all **entry points to prevent another bomb** from reaching its target**,** resulting in the disruption of the global "just-in-time" flow of goods and raw materials. Vital markets for international products would disappear, and closely linked financial markets would crash. Researchers at RAND, a U.S.-government-funded think tank, estimated that a nuclear explosion at the Port of Long Beach in California would cause immediate indirect costs worldwide of more than $3 trillion and that shutting down U.S. ports would cut world trade by 10 percent. [4] The negative economic repercussions would reverberate well beyond the developed world. As U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned, "**Were a nuclear terrorist attack to occur, it would** cause not only widespread death and destruction, but would **stagger the world economy and thrust tens of millions of people into dire poverty."**

**REGIONAL NUCLEAR WAR IMPACT**

This level of proliferation leads to nuclear war. Harold Muller[[6]](#footnote-4) writes in 08.

**A world populated by many nuclear-weapon states poses grave dangers. Regional conflicts could escalate to the nuclear level.** The optimistic expectation of a universal law according to which **nuclear deterrence** prevents all wars **rests on scant historical evidence and is dangerously naive. [because] Nuclear uses in one part of the world could trigger “catalytic war” between greater powers, drawing them into smaller regional conflicts, particularly if tensions are high. This was always a fear during the Cold War, and it motivated nonproliferation policy in the first place.** Moreover, the more states that possess nuclear weapons and related facilities, the more points of access are available to terrorists.

Jim Scott in 06 quantifies the impact.[[7]](#footnote-5)

**Even a small-scale regional nuclear war could produce as many fatalities as all of World War II, disrupt the global climate for a decade or more and impact nearly every person on Earth,** according to two new studies by University of Colorado at Boulder, Rutgers University and University of California, Los Angeles researchers. Presented at the fall meeting of the American Geophysical Union in San Francisco Dec. 11 and published Nov. 22 in the online journal Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Discussions, the two studies represent the first quantitative assessment of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between small or emerging nuclear powers, said CU-Boulder Professor Owen "Brian" Toon. Toon led the studies, working with UCLA Professor Richard Turco, Rutgers professors Alan Robock and Georgiy Stenchikov, CU-Boulder doctoral student Charles Bardeen and former Rutgers student Luke Oman, now a postdoctoral researcher at Johns Hopkins University**. "Considering the relatively small number and yields of the weapons, the potential devastation would be catastrophic and long term,**" said Toon, chair of CU-Boulder's atmospheric and oceanic sciences department. Toon, chief author of one of the two studies titled "Atmospheric Effects and Societal Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts and Acts of Individual Terrorism," said **fatality estimates** for such a regional conflict **ranged from 2**.6 **million to 16.7 million per country. [due to]** The estimates were based on current nuclear weapons inventories and **population densities in large urban regions** and took into account scenarios of smoke emissions that urban firestorms could produce, he said.

1. Andrea Sangiovanni. 2007. “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State.” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 35 (1): pp 3-39. [↑](#footnote-ref--1)
2. Scott A. Jones, Michael D. Beck, and Seema Gahlaut. 2009. “Chapter Six. Trade Controls and International Security.” In Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy. Ed. By Nathan Busch and Daniel Joyner. University of Georgia Press. Athens, Georgia. Google Books. BRL [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
3. Richard T. Cupitt. Spring 2000. “The Future of Export Controls.” In “Trade, Technology and Security in the 21st Century: A Special Issue in Conjunction with the Sam Nunn Policy Forum.” Center for International Trade and Security. Vol. 6, No. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
4. David S. Jonas and Christopher Swift. Fall, 2008. [Jonas: General Counsel, National Nuclear Security Administration. Adjunct Professor of Law, GU Law School and GWU Law School. Served in the Marine Corps. Swift: Ph.D Candidate, Department of Politics & International Studies; A.B. Dartmouth College; M.St. University of Cambridge; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center.] “Reformulating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Al-Qaeda, Global Terrorism, and the Rogue State Paradigm.” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs. 13. 337. LexisNexis. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
5. Graham Allison. September/October 2006. [Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is the author of "Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.”] “The ongoing failure of imagination.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Google Scholar [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
6. Harold Muller. 2008. [director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in Germany and a professor of international relations at Frankfurt University].“The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World,” Spring 08, The Washington Quarterly • 31:2 pp. 63–75. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
7. New Studies Show Regional Nuclear War Would Trigger Mass Death, Devastating Climate Change. Dec. 11, 2006 <http://www.colorado.edu/news/releases/2006/427.html>. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)